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INSURANCE

How Insurance
Substitutes for
Regulation
Through private contracting, insurers monitor
safety in ways that government can't.
BY OMRI BEN-SHAHAR AND KYLE D. LOGUE

L
L

egal regulation of behavior requires information.

or anticipate patterns in the behavior of sophisticated industries,

Acquiring information about the regulated party's con

often inspecting only a small sample of the regulated conduct.

duct, setting benchmarks by which that conduct is mea

They may be plagued by internal principal-agent problems and

sured, and establishing the correct scale of payoffs for

they are often outpaced and outsmarted by the regulated parties.

violating or following regulation are costly and require expertise

Can anyone regulate risky behavior better than the government?

and motivation. Thus, economic theories of rulemaking are

Private insurance companies can, and already do, replace or

often based on the relative information advantages that differ

augment the standard-setting and safety-monitoring currently

ent regulatory bodies have and how that information can be

performed by government. And they do so in ways that may

harnessed to enhance incentives and thereby improve welfare.

increase overall social welfare.

Government regulators, on average, do not have informational

To those readers trained in economics, this claim would seem

advantages. They are not paid for performance and thus may lack

counterintuitive. In much of the economic literature, insurance

adequate incentives. They are not disciplined by market forces and

is seen as antithetical to risk reduction. Indeed, one of the corner

only imperfectly disciplined by career concerns or by the political

stones of the economics of information is the moral hazard prob

are

process. Moreover, they commonly lack the most advanced tools for

lem: the idea that a party who is insured against risk has subopti

information acquisition, aggregation, and prediction. Courts, for

mal incentive to reduce it. As Joseph Stiglitz explained in his 1983

exam

ple, do not search for information independently, but instead

paper "Risk, Incentives, and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral

receive only what parries present to them through the litigation pro

Hazard," "the more and better insurance that is provided against

cess, which is costly, ad hoc, and as a result often bypassed by crude

some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the

settlements. Courts are also ill-equipped to recognize the distribu

insured event, because the less they bear the consequences of their

tion of characreristics from which any given case is sampled
Government agencies, too, have limited resources to monitor
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actions." Judge Frank Easterbrook concurred: "Insurance creates
moral hazard: when someone else pays the tab, the insured will take
additional risks and may incur costs deliberately"

(Burden-Meeks v.

Welch, 319 F.3d 897 (2003)).

We argue that insurance can reduce and in some cases solve,
rather than create or exacerbate, moral hazard and related incen
tive problems. When people create risk to others (or themselves),
insurance is the mechanism that converts the concern about the
loss or the vague threat of liability into a concrete set of harm-
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reducing measures. It supplies both the incentive and the know

insurers are efficient, customers should be lured by the discounts.

how that individuals and firms often lack, resulting in a more

Moreover, insurers' concern with affordability-increasing the

efficient level of accidents.

pool of its clientele-is another force pushing for increased con

We contend that private insurance markets can and some
times do outperform the government in regulating conduct

duct regulation. Safe behavior by insureds reduces the cost of
premiums and increases the size of the insurers' market.

because of both superior information and competition. Insurers
who can offer more coverage at lower premiums will attract cus
tomers, even when they require their customers to modify their

How Insurers Regulate Safety

conduct in a costly way. As long as the standards imposed by the

Information is critical to the business of insurance. Insurers use
Spring
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information in performing their risk-spreading and risk-shifting

stiff sanctions on insureds that misrepresent information.

functions. Information is necessary in pricing policies, assem

Second, insurers cooperate to pool and analyze risk-related

bling insurance pools, and verifying claims. Actuarialism-the

information through various industry-owned insurance rating

basic methodology in insurance-is the skill of computing pre

bureaus. These shared data and services, which are especially

miums according to information about probabilities and harms.

valuable to the smaller insurance companies that do not have

Insurers also use information in a subtler and less familiar

large quantities of their own data, make insurance markets more

way: to induce efficient risk-reducing behavior. The same data

stable and competitive.

that go into the risk-spreading and risk-shifting computations

Third, while insurers often use averages in underwriting and

are relevant and informative in determining how to reduce risk.

pricing policies (that is, estimates based on average accident costs

Insurers, therefore, perform the additional information-heavy

for parties that are similar to the insured), they are also able to

function of identifying and administering a system of safety

tailor and adjust their premiums according to each policyholder's

improvements. We view this
function as a form of privatized safety regulation.
Why do insurers want to
reduce the risk their policy
holders face? Insurance pur

································

Insurers not only have the incentive, the demand, and
the competitive pressure to collect and administer
information about risk, they also have the tools to do so.

chasers naturally gravitate to
insurance policies that offer the
most desirable combination of
price and product (both quality
and quantity). Therefore, insurers that can identify cheap risk-reduction measures can mandate

risk characteristics and ongoing behavior, as well as its loss experi

them and attract more business by offering lower premiums that

ence over time. Through these insured-specific premium adjust

more than offset the cost of the mandated measures.

ments over time, the insured is made aware of precisely what

Another reason why insurers regulate the risk-reduction
behavior of their customers is that the insurers are the ones

safety investments-both care-level and activity-level-correlate
with particular reductions in expected accident costs.

primarily benefiting from any risk reduction that occurs after

Differentiated insurance premiums provide explicit prices to

the policy is issued. Once the insured has paid the premium, any

people's choices of care in much the same way as government-set

covered loss that is suffered is borne by the insurer; therefore, any

Pigouvian taxes. Thus, in contrast to traditional command-and

loss prevented or reduced by care-level investments made by the

control rulemaking, where the agency is faced with a binary

insured is a net benefit to the insurer.

choice between whether to require a particular safety measure or

Insurers not only have the incentive, the demand, and the

not (which in turn requires the regulator to compare the benefit

competitive pressure to collect and administer information

of that safety measure with its cost), insurers need only to price

about risk, they also have the tools to do so. Below, we describe

the expected risk reduction associated with the safety investment.

the types of tools used by insurers to manage risk and incentivize

The insureds themselves then make the choice whether that

risk reduction.

safety investment-given its costs and benefits-makes sense in
their particular circumstances. Insureds for whom the cost of the
safety measure is low relative to its benefits will ''buy" it; others

Ex Ante Re gulation

will not. This sorting avoids the inefficiency of mandated, across

Insurers' most basic tool for creating incentives to reduce risk

the-board safety requirements.

is the setting of differentiated premiums. Insurers charge lower

I A standard assumption in the insur

premiums to careful policyholders, those that can prove they

Coaching safer conduct

take effective measures to reduce the insured risks. To deter

ance literature on moral hazard is that insurers have less infor

mine an insured's idiosyncratic level of care, insurers have to

mation about policyholders' idiosyncratic care levels and risk

collect information, which they do in various ways.

types than the policyholders themselves have. This assumption

First, during the underwriting process, insurers often require

is often contradicted by another widely held assumption about

their insureds to fill out lengthy insurance applications that

the insurance industry, that insurers have expertise in acquiring

provide the insurer with detailed information about their idio

and sorting complex information. While it is true that insureds

syncratic risk characteristics. The credibility of the information

have some information that insurers cannot observe, insurers

acquired during the underwriting is bolstered by the use of veri

are likely to have significant advantages in understanding and

fication methods, such as health screening tests for life insurance

calculating how different types of care and safety affect risk.

applicants or site surveys for environmental liability insurance.

While policyholders know which precautions they have taken,

The credibility of the underwriting process is also protected by

they often lack the expertise to quantify the effect of the pre-

38
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caution on risk reduction, and to ascertain whether the cost of

ance industry has its own association researching and promul

the precaution is justified. Is it worthwhile to refit one's home

gating standards of safety with respect to property risks.

with fire extinguishing sprinklers? To install a car antitheft
device? To take a particular medical screening test? Even com
mercial parties buying liability insurance may not realize how

Ex Post Re gulation

their expected cost would be reduced by taking simple precau

In addition to regulation prior to the loss, insurers also sub
stitute for ex post regulation-the attachment of legal conse

tions-until their insurer prices it.
Building on this information advantage, insurers perform a
regulatory function that public regulators rarely do: they "edu

quences to behavior after it has occurred. The most common
form of ex post legal regulation is a court-imposed sanction.

cate" their insureds on how to avoid and reduce risks. Product

A great body of literature explores the informational and

liability insurers, for example, offer "product protection" plans

administrative properties of ex post regulation. In this section, we

that review the safety of product designs, the quality controls in

are interested in identifying the informational tools that insurers

manufacturing, and the warnings attached to the product. Simi

have that government decisionmakers do not.

larly, workers' compensation insurers coach employers on how to

I

refit and organize the workplace and how to train their employ

Claims management

ees, all with an eye to avoiding costly accidents. Environmental

claims-management system, a network of adjusters who are

Every insurer operates some type of

liability insurers make on-site visits and instruct policyholders on

employed to investigate claimed losses, measure them, and

how to avoid costly damages and how to comply with (or exceed)

negotiate payouts. Claims adjusters implement in a routine,

environmental regulatory standards. Pollution insurance under

uniform way the investigation and fact-finding procedures

writers send engineers to the sites to examine how landfills are

that are designed centrally. They apply simple rules for deter

engineered and built and how waste is disposed, and to provide

mination of fault and causation, for quantifying losses, and for
settling disputes. This process reduces delays in payments to

instruction where needed.
Implementing private safety codes

I

claimants and transforms vague safety standards issued by law
Insurers are instrumen

into clear bright-line rules issued by insurers.

tal in disseminating efficient safety technology. Safety measures

I

that create positive externalities-benefits to other policyhold

Mitigation of loss

ers-would be underutilized in the absence of insurance. How

losses ex post is by helping to mitigate covered losses. This

ever, because insurance aggregates the interests of disperse

can be seen clearly in contractual provisions, found in most

policyholders, it helps to internalize such cross-insured ben

insurance policies, that require insureds to take all reasonable

Another way in which insurers regulate

efits. For example, car owners can fit their cars with devices like

post-accident steps to mitigate losses or else forfeit coverage.

Lojack, an antitheft transmitter that dramatically increases

Insurers also help insureds mitigate losses by monitoring repair

the chance of recovering a stolen car. Lojack creates a deterrent

services. The most ubiquitous example of this occurs in the

effect that actually benefits others and, owing to transaction

automobile insurance context. Auto insurers often exercise

costs, the Lojack purchaser cannot capture the value of this

strict control over the choice of companies to do the repairs.

benefit through a market transaction. Thus, car owners pur

Environmental insurers also maintain control over the choice

chase Lojack less often than is socially desirable. Insurance

of contractors that insureds can hire to do the remediation or

contracts offer a solution to this incentive problem. That is,

clean-up costs covered under environmental liability policies.

insurers serve to collectivize the otherwise externalized benefit

By getting directly involved in this way, insurers both reduce the

of the Lojack investment. Unsurprisingly, then, insurers pro

magnitude and gain an accurate estimate of the insured loss.

vide substantial premium discounts-often 20 percent-to auto

In addition, liability insurers help to control overall litigation
costs ex post through their role as the financer of their insureds'

owners who install Lojack.

I

legal defense. Liability insurance policies generally assign to insur
Insurers

ers the contractual obligation and responsibility to provide a legal

cooperate in identifying safety technologies and disseminating

defense for their insureds. As a result, liability insurers have expe

new risk reduction methods. For example, the auto insurance

rience and expertise in selecting defense counsel and managing

industry has for many years funded research designed to iden

litigation expenditures, resulting in lower overall costs. Although

Research and development of safety methods

tify ways to reduce the losses associated with automobile acci

this arrangement, where the insurer is both on the hook for loss

dents. The industry operates an institute that tests and rates

claims (within the policy limits) and in charge of the litigation,

the crashworthiness of automobiles, and it organizes concerted

can pose some conflicts of interests, it nevertheless leads to rea

efforts to lobby for mandatory safety devices (such as airbags).

sonably low-cost resolution of legal disputes for the vast majority

Likewise, many of the standards relating to fire prevention and

of liability insureds. More fundamentally, the role of insurers in

building fire codes were developed by the insurance industry

litigation and settlement often overrides the effect of substantive

and were subsequently accepted by builders, firefighters, courts,

compensation doctrines. For example, insurance policy limits,

and lawmakers as the state of the art. The homeowners' insur-

not legal remedies, are found to dictate the settlement amount.
Spring 2013
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I Another type of ex post regulation by

that would complement it as a regulator of risk. For example,

insurers, which has come under criticism from some commen

under a tort regime of no liability for product-caused harms (for

tators, consists of refusal to pay out claims based on policies

example, the old regime under which courts enforced product

Ex post underwriting

that were issued after the insured materially misrepresented

warranty disclaimers for personal injuries caused by product

some information at the underwriting phase. The efficient

accidents), the primary government regulator of product safety

functioning of insurance markets depends on insurers' ability

will be command-and-control government agencies and the

to gather accurate information about insurance applicants.

primary insurer-regulator will be first-party health insurers. By

To achieve this end, insurers have two general strategies: They

contrast, under a tort regime of strict products liability, the pri

can spend resources at the underwriting stage to investigate and

mary government regulator will be the courts and the primary

verify the information given by insureds on their applications;

insurer-regulator will be liability insurance companies. Thus the

and some of this they do. But exhaustive ex ante information veri

choice between no liability and strict liability turns largely on the

fication can be very costly. A cheaper alternative is for the insur

question of which type of insurance-first-party health, disability,

ers to accept as true the answers given by the insureds on their

and life insurance or third-party liability insurance-is better at

applications when submitted (unless there is a red flag on the

reducing product-related accidents.

application that suggests further investigation is warranted), but

The choice seems pretty clear. First-party insurers are poorly

then to examine more closely
only the applications of the
small subset of insureds that
end up submitting a loss claim.
Under this approach, only a
fraction of the applications
need to be thoroughly investi
gated. If a material falsehood
is then found, and if it can be

································

Thus the choice between no liability and strict liability
turns largely on the question of which type of
insurance-first-party health, disability, and life
insurance or third-party liability insurance-is better at
reducing product-related accidents.

shown that the insurer relied
upon that falsehood in issuing
or pricing the policy, the insurer can then rescind the policy and

equipped, and liability insurers are relatively well equipped, to

deny the insured's claim. The effect of this ex post denial of the

regulate consumer product risks. There is little that first-party

claim is to improve the ex ante incentives of insureds to provide

insurers can do to regulate consumer product-injury risks.

truthful information at the underwriting stage, and to do so at

Health, disability, and life insurers who would pay for harms

considerably lower cost than would be the case with exhaustive ex

caused to consumers by dangerous products under a no-liability

ante investigations by the insurer of every single insured.

regime do not ordinarily distinguish between, and charge differ

While there is a risk of insurer opportunism (for example,

ent premiums to, consumers who purchase relatively safe prod

insurers asking intentionally vague questions on the applica

ucts and those who purchase relatively dangerous products. They

tions to create the opportunity for a misrepresentation defense

do not monitor which products their policyholders purchase,

ex post) and innocent mistakes by consumers can occur during

how safely they use those products (care-level concerns), or how

the application process, those concerns can be addressed through

often they use those products (activity-level concerns). Nor do

common law doctrines, and bad faith sanctions can be imposed

first-party insurers deny claims on the grounds that the insured

on the worst-offending insurers when appropriate.

was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk. (One exception
is life insurance monitoring of cigarette smoking.) In fact, first
party insurance is often sold on a group basis, which means that

Examples oflnsurers as Safety Regulators

insurers do not gather detailed information about any individual

Agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission

risk characteristic of their insureds, including those related to

(CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration, and the National

product use. And even in policies that are individually under

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulate the

written, it is usually too costly for insurers to gather and update

safety of products and product use. In addition to such ex ante

product-use information. The result of this dearth of first-party

agency-based government regulation, product safety is also

regulatory intervention is moral hazard with respect to consumer

regulated ex post through the application of tort law by courts.

care and activity levels.

Choosing the ideal regulatory role of these two institutions

Can product liability insurers do better than first-party insur

agencies versus courts-is a familiar dilemma. But it cannot

ers at regulating product injury risk? Product liability insurance

be adequately resolved without an account of how insurance

is underwritten on a company-specific basis rather than a group

arrangements support (either replace or complement) the regu

basis. Product liability insurers have much at stake in the actuar

latory function of tort and agency law.

ial experience of each of their insured manufacturers, and so they

The choice of a liability standard affects the type of insurance
40
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collect detailed information about how the product is designed,

inspected, and manufactured; what types of quality controls and

absence of tort liability, and thus of liability insurers, does not

manufacturing standards the insureds have in place; whether

eliminate the incentives of drivers to avoid accidents that harm

parts used in the production process contain dangerous inputs

others. There is, after all, a large overlap between the risks that

and whether those parts are warranted by suppliers; and much

lead to harm to others and the risks that lead to injury to oneself

more. Product liability insurers also collect information about

Bad or excessive driving gives rise to an increased risk of both

the insured manufacturers' activity levels (i.e., sales volume) with

harms. Thus, when a first-party insurer takes steps to regulate

respect to particular product lines and about past marketing inci

driver conduct so as to reduce self-harm (for example, by experi

dents. Liability insurers are clearly more effective than first-party

ence rating and adjusting premiums), the risk to third-party

insurers at monitoring and regulating the safety of consumer

victims is also reduced.

products, hence the case for strict product liability as a form of

On the other hand, first-party auto insurers do not have an

product safety regulation-in contrast to a rule of no liability or

incentive to regulate driver decisions optimally. While it is true

even fault-based liability-is strengthened.

that the safety they regulate affects both the insured drivers and

Workers' co mpensation insurance

I

their victims, the insurers fail to take account of harm to oth
Workplace safety is

another area of regulation through insurance in which insur

ers. Thus, in theory, auto first-party insurers would not have an
incentive to require precautions that could be justified only by

ers play a major role in implementing and monitoring safety.

the total harm reduction to all potential injured parties. Those

Workers' compensation regimes, which have been adopted in

insurers do not make premium adjustments to account for the

all SO states, constitute a form of no-fault strict liability. States

increase or decrease in risk to third-parties attributable to their

require employers to purchase insurance either from a private

insured driver's behavior.

insurer or from a state-run workers' compensation fund. Work
ers who are injured on the job recover from their employer's

By contrast, under a fault-based tort regime in which drivers
also purchase liability insurance, a more complete internalization

workers' compensation insurer. In managing claims, insurers

of auto accident risks is achieved. As a result, under a fault-based

collect information concerning the circumstances that gave

regime, some unsafe drivers would be priced out of driving-a

rise to the injury and examine the medical records document

form of continually adjusting Pigouvian taxation through the

ing the injury. As already mentioned, workers' compensation

liability insurance premium-which would not occur under a

insurance is one of the areas in which insurers experience-rate

no-fault regime.

premiums and have done so for many years, and the process

In addition, under a fault-based system, drivers' choices

is facilitated by various industry organizations that aid in the

among types of cars are likely to be more efficient. First-party

collection and analysis of data.

insurance creates incentives to purchase large and heavy vehicles,

Workers' compensation regimes reduce worker-injury rates

such as outsized sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) or trucks, in which

more effectively than fault-based tort regimes and direct govern

drivers are protected and their injuries are smaller. Liability

ment regulation of workplace safety. Indeed, there is some direct

insurance offsets these distorted incentives. Heavy vehicles cause

evidence that experience-rating by workers' compensation insur

greater harm to others, and these costs in fault-based states are

ers has improved workplace safety, especially among larger firms

borne by liability insurers, who then price those risks accordingly.

where most individual workers are employed.

The result, in theory, should be not only a reduction in overall

Auto insurance

I The regulation of automobile driver safety is

divided between first-party and liability insurers. Some, but not
all, losses are shifted from victims and their first-party insurers

auto accident risks, but also an improvement in the market sig
nals sent to product manufacturers regarding the relative total
costs (including accident costs) of small versus large vehicles.
Auto insurance is also an area where insurance companies

to drivers and their liability insurers. States vary with respect to

liability and first-party insurers-work cooperatively to gather

the amount of loss shifting they do through their tort systems.

information that enhances the market for safety. For example, the

Most states have a tort-based auto insurance regime in which

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), a nonprofit orga

victims can recover from negligent drivers and their liability

nization that is wholly funded by the auto insurance industry

insurers, or otherwise turn to their own first-party insurers. In

and whose stated goal is to reduce the losses from crashes on the

those states, both first-party and liability auto insurers have an

nation's highways, has become famous for testing and rating the

incentive to regulate the care levels of their insureds. In contrast,

crashworthiness of new automobiles that come on the market,

a minority of states have some type of no-fault regime (a mis

and it does so long before-and arguable better than-the govern

nomer, which really means no-liability) in which tort recovery is

ment's NHTSA ratings. These ratings help consumers choose

limited and injured parties (other than pedestrians, whose tort

safer cars and induce manufacturers to improve the designs.

claims are not limited) must rely primarily on their first-party

I Residential property risk is another

auto insurers. In these states, therefore, first-party auto insurers

Homeowners' insurance

are the primary regulators of driver care levels.

area in which insurers regulate insured behavior. Most home

The shift to no-fault in some jurisdictions may on balance

owners cannot ascertain the quality of the structure they are

hinder the regulatory role of insurance. On the one hand, the

purchasing or the risks associated with inferior construction,
Spring
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especially under conditions of high winds, fire, or earthquake.

have passive restraints, factories must abide by environmental

And yet, except to the extent the CPSC regulates household

standards, drug companies must demonstrate the safety and

products, household risk is largely unregulated by the federal

efficacy of a drug, and commercial buildings must have fire

government. Rather, building safety standards are left to state

sprinkler systems. Unless the regulatory safety threshold is met,

and local governments, which typically adopt some version

the actor cannot engage in the regulated conduct. Regulated

of the model building codes written by private organizations.

parties have no choice concerning how much of the safety mea

Political pressures by the construction industry and short-term

sure to apply, whether it is worth the cost, or if other methods

financial interests of homeowners operate to inhibit optimal

work better for them.

standards and rigorous enforcement.

Insurers, on the other hand, often regulate the same conduct

Insurance helps to remedy this regulatory inefficiency. First,

while offering a menu of safety choices and corresponding prices.

homeowners' insurers engage in direct ex ante regulation through

Drivers who fail to wear seatbelts have their first-party insurance

the use of premium discounts for homes equipped with safety

premiums adjusted through experience rating. Factories that

measures, such as smoke detectors and sprinkler systems, that

maintain higher environmental standards than the government

have been found to dramatically reduce the risk of fire-related

mandated level have their liability insurance premiums reduced.

deaths and property damage. Similarly, insurers in Florida and

Manufacturers that follow guidelines for producing safer prod

other parts of the country subject to windstorms offer substantial

ucts pay lower product liability insurance premiums. And homes

premium discounts to homeowners who make special invest

that present higher fire hazards pay significantly higher property

ments in wind mitigation, such as installing hurricane clips to

insurance. Largely through ex ante premium adjustments, by

secure the roof, anchoring the base of the home to the founda

offering policyholders clear pecuniary tradeoffs, insurers induce

tion, and using special storm shutters on the windows.
Homeowners' insurers also do something that government

actors to self-select safety. Unlike government regulation, which
institutes uniform safety levels, insurers' regulation results in a

regulators do not: generate large amounts of risk-related infor

spectrum of decentralized choices whereby people choose greater

mation through large-scale hazard simulations. The industry is

precautions when their costs are lower or when the risks they

funding a massive research facility for simulating hurricanes and

reduce are greater.

other perils and studying how different construction techniques

I In the presence of government-imposed strict

withstand wind, fire, water, and hailstorm damage. Research

Pigouvian taxes

conducted at this facility is intended to do for home construc

liability, insurance converts the ex-post liability cost into an

tion standards what the crash testing conducted by the IIHS has

ex ante fee, the insurance premium. This fee resembles a pure

done for crashworthiness in automobiles, thereby reducing the

Pigouvian tax, paid upfront and roughly equal to the externality.

losses from natural hazards. Not only will this enable the indus

Risk-differentiated premiums cause parties to pay the expected

try to improve its rating of building codes, it will also refine the

external cost of their activity when choosing its scope. Insurers

premium discounts for various safety investments.

thus play an important role in shaping levels of activity. By con

In each of these areas-product liability insurance, workers'

verting the uncertain expected cost of liability into a certain cost

compensation insurance, automobile insurance, and homeown

of the insurance premium, premiums enable insureds to make

ers' insurance-insurers already serve as quasi-private regulators

more-informed choices regarding activity levels.

of risk. Because of their superior access to information and their

To be sure, government agencies can also engage in informa

commercial sophistication, and because of the competitive pres

tion gathering. But unlike with insurers, the information prac

sure to find new ways to lower their costs and hence their prices,

tices of government agencies do not have to be accurate for the

insurance companies employ a variety of strategies to improve the

agencies to perform their primary tasks because the agencies are

safety conduct of their policyholders. In many of these examples,

not themselves insuring the externality. Thus, they do not have to

the presence of insurance reduces, rather than creates, a moral

bear the costs of the harm from imperfect tailoring. By contrast,

hazard problem.

insurers who set inaccurate premiums (inaccurate Pigouvian
taxes, as it were) would suffer a loss of profit and, at the limit,
would be out of business.

Insurance Versus Government Regulation

I

Insurance arrangements

For many, risk insurers generally work alongside the govern

Converting standards into rules

ment to regulate safety. In those areas, we identify how the

transform the standards enacted through government regula

regulatory work is divided between the insurers and govern

tion into bright-line rules, thereby providing regulated parties

ment regulators and document the added value of insurance

(insureds) with concrete instruction regarding the choice of

incremental improvements in safety that go beyond what the

appropriate care levels. Negligence regimes in tort law, for

government requires or encourages.

example, set general "due care" standards; however, the deter

I

mination of which particular safety measures are required by
Government regulation of safety

such standards is often left unclear to the regulated parties

often takes the form of mandatory safety standards. Cars must

until a court resolves that question in particular cases ex post.

Mandates versus menus
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I Like the insurance industry, gov

Under such negligence regimes, liability insurers are often the

Disseminating information

agents that translate the vague legal standards into a set of

ernment agencies gather and use information as a basic tool

concrete, sometimes-very-specific rules. A similar mechanism

in regulating safety. For example, NHTSA collects accident

also operates under strict liability regimes, which do not man

reports from traffic law enforcers around the country, as do

date particular safety standards, but leave the regulated parties

insurers. The FDA collects information about drugs; the CPSC

to determine the privately desirable risk-reduction measures.

collects information about risky products; the Environmental

Under those regimes as well, it is often the liability insurer who

Protection Agency collects information about the release of

instructs the regulated party regarding specific safety choices.

hazardous substances; and municipalities collect information

A prominent example of this collaboration between the stan

about restaurants' hygiene.

dard-setting public regulators and standard-deciphering insurers

Like insurers, the government disseminates this informa

is traffic safety. Tort law and highway safety regulations establish a

tion about risk to help people make informed decisions. Thus,

framework for determining reasonable care and accident liability.

NHTSA publishes SUV rollover ratings as well as many other

But it is the insurance process that often establishes which actor

auto safety facts. But safety ratings were prominently available

is responsible for the accident, based on "mechanical and super

long before NHTSA began publishing SUV rollover ratings. For

ficial formulas." Because insurers have to follow routines, because

over 50 years, the auto insurance industry has published well

they have to constrain the discretion that low-level adjusters

known car safety ratings that are often more stringent and cover
more safety factors than NHT
SA's. For example, the insur

For over 50 years, the auto insurance industry has
published well-known car safety ratings that are
often more stringent and cover more safety factors
than N HTSA's.

ance industry's four-grade scale
includes many safety attributes
that go beyond rollover risk. It
takes into account a car's roof
strength and how much protection it provides in the event
of a rollover. Experts can debate
whether the insurance ratings
capture a more or less impor-

exercise, and because basic principles of fault and negligence are

tant set of factors than the government's ratings, but it is likely

difficult to apply, insurers turn to "mechanical presumptions"

that the more robust the ratings that insurers produce, the less

such as presumed liability for the negligent drivers in rear-end

necessary is the government's scheme. Given the comprehensive

collisions or for drivers turning left in front of oncoming traffic.

data insurers have and their incentive to rate cars credibly, this

The pressure to run an efficient claims bureaucracy and to "close

particular safety-related exercise can probably be largely out

cases" generates greater reliance on simple rules than the back

sourced to the insurance industry.

ground legal system provides.
Stricter codes of safety

I Another function that insurers per

Expanding the Role oflnsurance

form is the design of safety mandates that exceed the gov

Can private insurance markets supplement or even replace

ernment-regulated "floor." Take building codes, for example.

regulation in some settings? Below are some suggestions for

Although municipalities vary in the level of safety investments

doing so.

that they require in residential and commercial buildings, they

I Consumers require protection because

are often quite lenient. While it is true that electrical wiring is

Consumer contracts

inspected for safety and commercial buildings must meet fire

they sometimes agree to bad terms in their contracts, not

safety and emergency standards, many of the safety-related ele

understanding in advance what they have agreed to. Consum

ments of the design and construction process are left unregu

ers also require protection because the promises that are made

lated. Property insurers step in and incentivize-and sometimes

to them are sometimes broken: for example, products are not

even require-adherence to stricter safety standards. Similarly,

as described, merchandise is not delivered, money is excessively

environmental regulations set various standards relating to

charged. When these breaches occur, contract law provides

environmental exposures and harms. Environmental liabil

remedies, but enforcement is costly and largely impractical.

ity insurers complement this regulatory floor by requiring

Individual consumers cannot credibly threaten to sue; as a

their insureds to comply with stricter codes written by private

result, businesses are undeterred.

groups. They go beyond minimal compliance checks by pro

dass actions are one way to deal with this under-enforcement

moting, through discounts and mandates, participation in

problem, but impediments to such actions abound. Some claims

private Environmental Management Systems that follow strict

are not aggregable into representative classes; some contracts waive

codes of environmental compliance.

class-action rights; and attorney-fee arrangements sometimes
Spring
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produce an imperfect selection of cases. The universe of contract

or otherwise wrongful behavior and, in effect, ''blacklist" them.

claims that are too small or too complex to pursue individually

Sellers that are repeat offenders could be singled out by insurers

in litigation is vast. Often obscured by lengthy standard forms,

and classified as bad risks. Insurers could, in turn, warn insured

consumers cannot distinguish their rights, cannot adequately seek

consumers not to purchase from these high-risk sellers and could

redress, and have to rely on nonlegal mechanisms (e.g., sellers' rat

in extreme cases exclude coverage for claims arising out of sales

ings, retailer return policies) to steer clear of the risk of loss.

involving the worst-offending sellers. Exclusions that say such

Do first-party insurance arrangements relieve some of the

things as, "This policy does not cover purchases from Seller X,"

insecurity that consumers, deprived of de facto contractual

would serve the ex ante regulatory role of increasing the salience

remedies, experience in these contexts? And could such insur

of those companies' nonperformance risk, deterring misconduct.

ance actually provide businesses with incentives to perform their
promises?

Market-making insurers can even charge businesses for cover
age. For example, eBay Motors provides an insurance-like buyer

Pockets of explicit first-party consumer-protection insur

protection program without charging buyers any premium.

ance already exist, and it is not difficult to see why. Consider, for

Instead, it charges sellers for the cost of the program, and it can

example, individuals who purchase cars on eBay Motors. In that

differentiate the price according to the seller's record and expel

market, consumers send money to sellers who often do not have

sellers who breach their obligations.

a brick-and-mortar location, have undeveloped reputations and

Why is such an insurance product not already offered broadly?

limited assets, and who, for all of these reasons, might easily take

We noted that miscellaneous first-parry consumer insurance
pockets exist through the
efforts of market makers, pay

The market-makers, retailers, and payment
intermediaries sometimes step in and offer bonds,
guarantee programs, or recovery funds to induce
buyers to enter their network.

ment systems, and warranty
programs-all in areas in which
the liability system is ineffec
tive in shifting the costs to the
wrongdoers. But the full-blown
information tools of the insurance industry have not been
harnessed to this end, perhaps
because the demand for such

the money and run. Yes, buyers have legal remedies when eBay

coverage is already filled by the niche assurance products. What

sellers breach their agreements, but the enforcement of such

seems more likely, however, is that, until recently, it was assumed

remedies is unlikely.

by insurers that the demand for coverage against the risks of

Perhaps in response to this legal-remedial void, eBay Motors

consumer product under- or nonperformance was met by the

itself provides a number of options for insuring car buyers against

product sellers themselves through the sale of product warranties.

the risk of non- or underperformance by car sellers. For example,

It is also possible that the trend in American law of businesses

eBay Motors provides disappointed buyers a fund from which

using mandatory arbitration clauses to immunize themselves

they can recover the lost payment if the seller defrauds them, up

against court-imposed liability for breach of consumer product

to $50,000. Similarly, online purchasers of consumer electronics

contracts may dramatically increase the demand for first-party

can use a service like SquareTrade to buy what amounts to first

insurance coverage as a substitute for legal control of consumer

party insurance against the types of risks that contractual seller

product quality.

provided warranties would usually cover. Credit card issuers often
provide similar "purchase protection" to buyers of consumer
products who use the issuer's credit card as the form of payment.

Conclusion

PayPal likewise offers a "Buyer Protection Plan" that reimburses

Insurers regulate risk in various ways. From mandating spe

buyers for the full price and shipping costs if their complaint

cific investments in risk reduction, to offering premium dis

against the seller is found to be meritorious. In all of these cases

counts for favorable claims experience, to selling cost-con

where there is a risk of the seller taking the money and running,

tainment expertise to policyholders, and even to the design

the market makers, retailers, and payment intermediaries some

of safety technologies and codes, insurers perform many of

rimes step in to offer bonds (or guarantee programs or recovery

the same regulatory functions that government regulators

funds) to induce buyers to enter their network.

and courts perform. However, in many (though obviously

Perhaps less obvious, this new type of first-party consumer

not all) situations, private insurers, because of their inherent

transaction insurance could also deter opportunism on the part

informational comparative advantage, should be expected

of businesses that sell to consumers. For example, through vari

to do the job of regulation better than public regulators and

ous information aggregation techniques, insurers might be able

courts. Through private contracting, insurers monitor safety

to identify sellers who engage systematically in opportunistic

in ways that legal commands cannot.
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